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Abstract
The road from a petroleum discovery to production is long, especially
in developing countries. On average they take 7 years with a standard de-
viation of 9 years and a quarter of the fields are yet to reach production.
I analyze the drivers of petroleum project timelines using survival analy-
sis and event study methods. Institutions are a key factor. Democracies
and state owned firms operating domestically are significantly quicker.
My findings suggest earlier research relying on lagged impacts of giant
petroleum discoveries provided biased estimates of the effects of oil pro-
duction shocks.
Keywords: natural resources, institutions, national oil companies
JEL classification: P50, Q33, Q35
∗I am grateful to Anna Augusztin for excellent research assistance. I thank Tamas Bartus,
Caitlin Brown, Michael Dorsch, Paasha Mahdavi, Rick Van der Ploeg, Gerhard Toews and
participants of the World Bank Africa’s Resource Future workshop for their comments.
†David Mihalyi: Natural Resource Governance Institute. Email: davidmihalyi@gmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
When a country makes a major oil or gas discovery, policy makers and citizens
alike expect it to bring revenues and economic transformation soon. But the re-
ality is that petroleum finds can take over a decade to reach production, if ever.
For example, Uganda had a series of large oil discoveries starting in 2006. The
government and petroleum companies initially targeted oil production to start
in 2009. However, negotiations around taxes and pipeline routes stalled and and
the government now targets oil to first start flowing in 2024. In Kazakhstan, the
Kashagan field was discovered in 2000, and though companies invested quickly,
it took 13 years for them to developed the field after technical set backs and
disputes between participants. A number of other countries which made im-
portant petroleum discoveries subsequently failed to turn these into production
(Mihalyi and Scurfield, 2021).
I study the factors affecting petroleum asset extraction timelines. My aim is
to untangle geological characteristics of the fields and global time trends from
characteristic that are influenced by producer country institutions. My research
takes advantage of a unique global dataset with data on project timelines for
over 25,000 petroleum fields discovered since 1950 across the globe. I use two
different methodologies for the analysis: survival analysis and an event study
approach.
Petroleum assets can be slow to be developed. On average, it took oil and
gas fields that were developed 7 years to reach production with a standard
deviation of 9 years. A quarter of the fields are yet to reach production stage.
Giant discoveries take twice the time to turn to production than conventionally
assumed in economic literature: the pre-production period is of over 10 years
rather than the 5 years used in a number of economic studies.
Asset and country characteristics both matter. For example gas and deep(er)
offshore fields are slower to be developed. Those located in countries which
are richer, have a longer history of petroleum production or that have stronger
institutions are quicker. For example, a similar giant gas discovery is twice as
likely to remain underground within a 20 year window if found in an autocracy
compared to a democracy.
State ownership also matters. Assets with partial ownership by the domestic
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national oil company are quicker to be developed once controlling for other
factors, but these national oil companies are associated with slower timelines
on their projects abroad. I also study how the likelihood of assets starting
production changes in the years surrounding the the (partial) nationalization of
the industry. Setting up of a national oil company is followed by an about 20
percent increase in likelihood of projects starting up in the subsequent period.
My results call into question the findings from earlier research which treated
(giant) petroleum discoveries as causing exogenous shocks to subsequent pro-
duction by assuming uniform petroleum project timelines. The impacts these
earlier studies capture typically five years after giant discoveries underestimate
the effects of oil production and are skewed towards measuring production im-
pacts in countries where fields are developed quicker. Alternatively, some of the
effects they estimate (e.g. increase in conflict or borrowing) may in fact have
happened prior to production. 1
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places this research in the broader
literature and highlights selected papers relying on an assumption that my pa-
per calls into question. Section 3 provides some context on petroleum project
timelines for the benefit of those less familiar with the industry. Section 4 de-
scribes the data I use in the analysis and key characteristics of project timelines
based on summary statistic. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis results
based on two distinct empirical strategies: survival analysis and an event study.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related economic literature
The relationship between economic growth and resource wealth has been sub-
ject to extensive study and debate (for recent surveys see Ross (2015); Van der
Ploeg (2011)). An emerging consensus agrees that any overall resource curse
effect is best understood as mediated by the quality of institutions (Mehlum
et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006). They argue that countries with strong po-
litical institutions are better placed to reap the benefits of resource wealth, in
contrast, countries with weak institutions are more susceptible to the various re-
1Cust and Mihalyi (2017) discuss how oil finds may impact a country’s development prior
to production start, a phenomenon dubbed the ’presource curse’.
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source curse mechanisms. One attribute these studies share is the examination
of the relationship between resource wealth’s contribution to the economy, typi-
cally measured via production value, export dependence or government revenue
windfalls, and economic performance.
However, as pointed out by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), resource wealth
or dependence may be shaped by past economic performance, policy choices
and political institutions. For example, exploration efforts by investors, and
therefore the observed pattern of geological wealth, are themselves dependent
on institutional factors (Arezki et al., 2019; Cust and Harding, 2019). As a
consequence any correlations between resource dependence and economic per-
formance do not prove causality on their own - since there may be other factors
causing both the observed level of resources in a country, and its economic or
political fate.
Hence many recent studies have analyzed the impact of giant oil and gas discov-
eries instead of the level of petroleum wealth measured by reserves, production
or some other contemporaneous measure of its contribution to the economy.
For example, research by Arezki et al. (2016) examines the impacts on macroe-
conomic variables such as employment, savings, investment and the current
account, Cust and Mihalyi (2017) the short-term growth responses, Harding
et al. (2020) the impact on relative prices and real exchange rates, Abdelwahed
(2020) the impact on domestic taxation, Perez-Sebastian et al. (2021) the trade
policy responses and Lei and Michaels (2014) studies armed conflicts following
giant discoveries. As argued by the authors of above studies, such discoveries
are largely unanticipated ‘lucky’ events where the within-country timing of in-
dividual discoveries may be plausibly exogenous once we account for country
and year fixed effects. Countries have very little means to influence the timing
of such large discoveries.
The studies above also implicitly or explicitly rely on the assumption that all
discoveries are equal in their likelihood and speed to reach production. Arezki
et al. (2016), Harding et al. (2020), Abdelwahed (2020) and Perez-Sebastian
et al. (2021) use the assumption that production starts five years after discovery,
when interpreting subsequent events as being caused by petroleum production.
Many of the studies also includes robustness checks, for example Perez-Sebastian
et al. (2021) also looks at pre-production periods of 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 years, with
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the 5 year being their central estimate.
The assumption of an average 5 year pre-production period is originally posited
and discussed in most detail in Arezki et al. (2016). It is supported by the
following four pieces of evidence. First, there is a graphical illustration of the
production profile including pre-production times from two Norwegian oil fields
(exact number of years is unclear but approx. 5 years). Second is an expert
estimate cited based on US drilling experience which reports an average of 4-
6 years between drilling and production.2. Third, Mike Horn, a geologist and
author of the giant discovery dataset is quoted suggesting it may take an average
of 7 years (no citation). Finally the authors’ report calculations based on a
subset of giant discoveries using data compiled by Global Energy Systems at
Uppsala University which contains both discovery and production dates. This
dataset consists of 157 giant fields discovered since 1970 where the average pre-
production time is of 5.4 years. But as explained by the authors of the dataset
in Höök et al. (2009), the ”Fields that have not yet reached their decline phase
(as of 2005) are excluded”. Therefore the dataset is truncated and the estimate
is likely to be downward biased given that it excludes fields that failed to reach
peak production in time.
The lack of production start date in the giant discovery dataset has led to various
workarounds. In their study of the impacts of giant discoveries on conflict, Lei
and Michaels (2014) try to establish the likely timing of production start by
looking at the time lag between giant discoveries and total country-level oil
output. They find an increase in production 2 years after discovery, which
then remains elevated from year 4 post-discovery on-wards. Though their study
attributes the increased oil output to the discovery reaching production, a study
by Güntner (2019) finds that this is partly driven by increase in production from
other oil fields.
Another relevant paper, by Smith (2015) using a different dataset constructed
by the author, looks at the impact of a country’s first oil discovery and its
subsequent impact on economic growth. Here the author warns of the possibility
that certain countries might be slower to get from discovery to production, but
ultimately discards this as a minor confounder with regards to long-term (up
to 30 years) economic impacts of oil finds. But his estimation also omits all the
2source: Why “Drill, Baby, Drill!” is Not a National Energy Policy by Thimothy D Kailing
http://www.ellipticalresearch.com/drillingandoilproduction.html
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countries, which had a first oil discovery but did not reach oil production by the
end of the time period reviewed.
Some researchers analyzed the impact of discoveries at the level of a single
country or in a region and have more explicitly tackled heterogeneity in project
timelines. Toews and Vézina (2018) analyzes the impact of large gas discovery
in Mozambique on FDI, while Henstridge (2018) studies the expected benefits of
large gas discovery in Tanzania. Both these studies acknowledge the extended
delays and uncertain faith of these gas projects, neither of which has reach
production 10 years later. A study by Anderson et al. (2018) evaluates the
impact of oil prices on extraction decision in Texas. Merrill and Orlando (2020)
assesses how violence influences extraction decision in the Middle East.
While these latter studies are notable exceptions, research on the expected im-
pact of newly found resource wealth often devotes limited attention as to when
(if at all) an oil discovery will be turned to production. My research provides
more reliable estimates of the expected pre-production period based on key
country and asset level characteristics.
My research also sheds new light on the role of national oil companies. Previous
research by Mahdavi (2014) identifies a number of factors which drive govern-
ments to set up such companies, including a desire to extract larger revenues
from existing production. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) assesses the impact
of such companies on resource exploration and finds that national ownership
leads to fewer discoveries.
My results could be applied to study the energy transition. Over the past 35
years, for every barrel of oil extracted globally, approximately two have been
added to estimates of proved oil reserves. (Dale and Fattouh, 2018). On the
other hand, climate researchers warn that in order to mitigate climate change,
a large share of already discovered oil and gas wealth has to stay underground.
For example, McGlade and Ekins (2015) calculates that one third of current
oil reserves and half of gas reserves must remain in the ground or ’stranded’ to
meet the 2C target. When studying which country’s reserves are most likely to
be stranded, earlier research relied on estimated drilling costs associated with
extraction, e.g Mercure et al. (2018), McGlade and Ekins (2015) and Manley
and Heller (2021), while Manley et al. (2017) relied on past recovery rates.
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Institutional factors may influence which country’s hydrocarbon reserves be-
come stranded. My research enables to study future energy transition scenarios
assuming various geological and institutional factors continue to excerpt similar
influence as they did in the past. Economists have warned that there may be a
green paradox, where profit-maximizing oil companies decide to accelerate fuel
extraction in anticipation of a shift to renewable energy (Sinn, 2008), (Van der
Ploeg and Withagen, 2012). My findings would suggest that in fact, state-owned
companies may extract even quicker.
3 Context - The journey from discovery to pro-
duction
In this section, I provide a description of the steps involved in getting from
discovery to production as a background to the subsequent analysis.3
Around the world petroleum companies regularly acquire licenses or permit to
explore a certain area for oil and gas. These licenses/permits provide the fiscal
and regulatory terms for their operations. Once they have obtained such rights,
they may conduct geological and geophysical surveys and carry out exploratory
drilling in promising locations. If they do not find anything for a number of
years, they are typically required to give up on these rights (relinquish their
license) so governments can bring in new companies to carry out exploration.
In case of a successful oil find, the company has the right keep the license and
develop the asset.
The life of an oil and gas asset, such as those in our database, starts an explo-
ration well strikes oil or gas, hence a new field is discovered. After an initial
discovery, the companies enter the appraisal phase, when further wells labelled
appraisal wells or delineation wells are drilled, with the motive of assessing
the size and viability of the initial find. Many successive wells may be drilled
depending on the results of drilling. The appraisal may take several years to
complete.
3This section draws heavily on Rystad database’s handbook and an industry
explainer from Oilprice.com https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Complete-
Guide-To-FIDs.html
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After appraisal, the next stage is the feasibility study. This is the phase in which
the initial concept for an oil and gas project is developed. The study identifies
the resources, how much (roughly) the project would cost, and where the money
to finance it would come from and what the returns may be on the project. If
more than one company is developing an oil or gas resource, companies set
out the basic structure of a joint venture, including the stakes each company
will have and which of them will be the operator, leading the consortium of
companies. In many countries, a local company or the state-owned oil and gas
firm is required to be a joint venture participant. The oil companies may request
the revision of initial terms from the government in order to make the project
commercially more viable. Such negotiations may be protracted.
Next companies need to obtain all the necessary permits and file all required doc-
umentation related to the project, including environmental impact assessments
(EIAs) and route permits from authorities. The respective regulators have to
approve the project before companies can proceed with any actual construction
work. Contentious permitting issues may include the route of pipeline, water
use, gas flaring. Permit approval can get delayed or requests may be rejected,
requiring change of plans. The Front End Engineering and Design (FEED)
stage sets in details the technical and financial options reviewed in the feasi-
bility study. The FEED examines the technical requirements and provides an
estimate of the overall project costs and the costs of each phase, with support
from engineering contractors. For massive oil and gas projects, FEED contracts
typically take around a year to complete.
The next big milestone, which I also record in the database, is the approval. It
designates the when year the asset was approved/sanctioned for development.
This is the point in an energy project in which the company or companies
owning and/or operating the project approve—or sanction—the project’s future
development. This is often labelled Final Investment Decision (FID) in the
industry press. Typically, it is the board of directors of a company involved in
an oil and/or gas project who makes the Final Investment Decision for a project.
After approval, companies start developing the project, a phase labeled Engi-
neering, procurement, construction (EPC). In EPC, engineering includes basic
and detailed engineering, planning, construction engineering. Procurement in-
cludes procurement, purchasing, invoicing, logistics and transport. Construc-
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tion includes civil engineering, electrical installation, and mechanical installa-
tion. Project development may see unexpected setbacks in any number of these
activities.
Finally, the project reaches its start-up, the third milestone recorded in the
database, when the petroleum recovery begins. This episode is often labelled
reaching first-oil or first-gas.
Once production started, production can be halted (labelled shut-in), though
this is rarely done due to associated costs. Once most of the oil is extracted
from an asset, and any further extraction is no longer commercially viable, then
wells are plugged and the asset is abandoned. I do not analyze the life of an
asset beyond when production starts.
The below graph provides a simple depiction of the stages I analyze using the
database. It also highlights that on average, the period from discovery to ap-
proval is longer than the period from approval to start.
discovery approval startup
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4 Descriptive statistics on project timelines
I analyze the production timelines of petroleum projects using a global dataset of
oil and gas fields. I rely primarily on a large proprietary database by Rystad En-
ergy 4 Their Ucube (Upstream) Database consists of a complete asset-by-asset
database of the world’s known oil and gas resources. Though their database
includes petroleum fields discovered as far back as 1900, I limit my analysis to
the 27,690 assets discovered between 1950 and 2020 based on the availability
of complementary datasets. Of these I also drop 729 observations which are
labelled extensions, expansions or consecutive phases of existing assets.5 In
the remaining cases, Rystad’s definition of an asset is generally equivalent to a
petroleum field. This results in a total dataset size of 26,961 petroleum assets.
For each petroleum asset I retrieve its year of discovery, the year of approval
when the asset gets green light for development, and startup when the field
reaches production stage, where these stages were reached.6 A dummy records
fields that are yet to reach approval and production stages. I also calculate the
number of years the asset has spent without producing, using the year 2020 for
the assets that are yet to reach production. This variable takes the minimum
value of 0 when production started in same year as the discovery happened and
its maximum is 70 years for an asset discovered in 1950 that is yet to reach
production as of 2020.7
Table 1: Summary statistics for all discoveries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Producing 0.758 0.428 0 1 26961
Approved 0.77 0.421 0 1 26961
Start Disc Producing 6.984 9.234 0 70 20445
Appr Disc Producing 5.46 8.33 0 63 20445
Start Appr Producing 1.524 2.404 0 53 20445
Start Disc All 10.765 13.018 0 70 26961
Appr Disc All 9.575 12.88 0 70 26961
Start Appr All 1.547 2.472 0 56 20751
4Rystad is an independent energy research and business intelligence company providing
data and related consultancy services to the global energy industry.
5I drop them as their timeline are not indicative of first oil or gas from a given discovery.
6For assets not yet granted approval or not yet producing, the Rystad database also pro-
vides some forecasts, but I ignore these.
7In the survival analysis set up presented below I add one to the number of years between
dates to avoid having 0s which are not compatible with the specification.
10
Table 1 provides summary statistics on all assets discovered between 1950 and
2020. First, I show the ratio of assets that reached its start up stage (Pro-
ducing) and those that passed approval stage (Approval). It shows that 76
percent reached production, while marginally more 78 percent have been ap-
proved. Then I show the years between discovery and start up stage (Start-
disc-Producing), discovery and approval (Appr-Disc-Producing) and approval
and start up (Start-Appr-Producing) for all assets that have reached produc-
tion. It takes on average 7 years to get from discovery to production among
producing assets, of which 5.5 is getting from discovery to approval stage, and
another 1.5 from approval to startup. Finally, I show the values for the same
variable, but on the full sample but using 2020 for those that have not (yet)
started producing (Start-disc-All), (Appr-Disc-All), (Start-Appr-All). The av-
erage asset in the full sample has spent about 11 years not producing, and almost
10 years not reaching approval stage. The average value for (Start-Appr-All) is
similar to the producing only sample, as few of the assets have reached approval
but not yet producing.
Table 2: Summary statistics for giant discoveries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Producing 0.775 0.418 0 1 1284
Approved 0.798 0.401 0 1 1284
Start Disc Producing 10.367 11.244 0 63 995
Appr Disc Producing 7.984 10.114 0 59 995
Start Appr Producing 2.383 2.646 0 39 995
Start Disc All 13.73 14.533 0 70 1284
Appr Disc All 11.828 14.325 0 70 1284
Start Appr All 2.382 2.644 0 39 1025
I also provide the same descriptive statistics in Table 2 for the subset of assets
(fields) where the estimated volume of petroleum resource discovered exceeds
500 million barrels, the threshold used to denote giant discoveries. It shows that
78 percent of giants have reached production, a similar ratio to the full sample.
Most giant discoveries that reached approval stage have also started production.
The pre-production period is over 10 years across the giant discoveries that
ultimately reached production stage and close to 14 years when also considering
assets not yet producing. These values are well above the timelines presented
on the full sample of discoveries. It takes 2.4 years to get from approval to the
start of production, considerably more than the 1.5 for all discoveries, but still
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a relatively short period within the full timeline from discovery to the start of
production.
These figures are relevant and present a stark contrast to the growing literature
presented in section 2 on the impacts of giant discoveries. 8 As opposed to the
5 year pre-production period average assumed in multiple studies, this dataset
suggests the period is over 10 years for those that have reached production and
nearly a quarter of the fields are yet to be developed. The large difference in
averages is most likely attributed to the fact that earlier studies used evidence
of limited geographical scope and truncated data by Höök et al. (2009) only
looking at fields which reached peak production within a certain period.
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of assets by region and presents the range of
the time from discovery to production observed (or until 2020 for assets not yet
producing). It shows that there is large variation between regions, with assets in
the Americas on average being developed twice as quickly (6.4 years) as assets
in Sub-Saharan Africa (16.8 years).
As shown in Figure 2 the data also reveals stark differences in pre-production
periods in democracies and autocracies. Whereas the mean years between dis-
covery and production (or 2020 for non-producing assets) is 8.1 years for fields
discovered in democracies (polity score above 5 on -10 to 10 scale), it close to
double or 15.5 years in autocracies (polity score below -5 on -10 to 10 scale).
There is a similar gap for giant discoveries (9.1 year versus 16.9 years).
As shown in Figure 3 larger fields are slower to be developed. The size of the
field matters especially for gas fields, where large fields may take triple as long as
smaller ones. This could be explained by the need for more complex transport
infrastructure to market larger gas fields if the amount of volume found greatly
exceeds local demand.
Although the literature estimating the impact of petroleum discoveries tends to
focus on giant discoveries, the remainder of my analysis focuses on all discoveries
in order to maximize sample size.
8The giant discovery sub-sample I present is not identical to Horn (2011). Though both
datasets measure this using the expected ultimate recovery (EUR) of the fields in barrels of
oil equivalent at time of discovery, they rely on different underlying data sources and probably
different geological assumptions used in calculations. For the comparable 1950 - 2010 period,
there are 1171 giant discoveries in Horn (2011), while there are 1002 in Rystad’s Ucube dataset.
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Figure 1: Box plot of asset timelines by region
0 20 40 60
Years from discovery to production
Oceania (n = 1278)
Europe (n = 6770)
Asia (n = 5260)
Americas (n = 10707)
Africa (n = 2946)
Note: The age of assets yet to start producing are counted until 2020.
Regions according to UN Stats classification.
Figure 2: Box plot of asset timelines by regime type and asset size
0 20 40 60
Years from discovery to production
Democracy
Autocracy
Note: The age of assets yet to start producing are counted until 2020.
Sample: Countries with polity score above 5 (Democracy) & below -5 (Autocracy) at time of discovery.
Giant assets are those with resource size above 500 MMBOE.
All assets Giant assets
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Note: Only showing assets that reached production by 2020.
Oil vs gas is based on which resource was found in larger quantities in barrel equivalent.
For each field, I obtained a range of geologically significant characteristic from
the Ucube database. These are the size of the field measured in the log of the
total barrel of oil and gas resources (lnAssetSize), the log of the water-depth of
the field (lnWaterDepth), the share of gas (vs oil) within the find (GasShare),
whether the asset is shale or not (Shaledummy).
I supplement the dataset with some country level characteristics. These are the
polity scores by Polity IV Project on the level of democracy (polity2), the log of
the per-capita level of GDP (lnGDPpc) from the Penn World Tables and the log
of the number of assets that have already reached production prior to the asset
in question ((lnCountryProdHist). This latter variable captures the experience
of a country in developing petroleum assets.
I also add the log of the nominal Brent oil price series from the World Bank
commodity data tables (lnOilPrice). Adding a (Year) numerical variable to
regressions enables to capture the impact of technological progress.
For each asset, the time varying variables can be measured at time of discovery,
production start or any year in between. I present the descriptive statistics
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with time varying variables measured at discovery year in Table 3, which is the
preferred measure I use in the survival analysis.
Table 3: Description and summary statistics of additional variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
DiscoveryYear 26,961 1,989 17.62 1,950 2,020
Gas Share 26,961 0.470 0.396 0 1
ln Field Size 26,961 2.890 1.835 0.000394 10.97
Shale dummy 26,961 0.0707 0.256 0 1
ln WaterDepth 26,961 1.566 2.209 0 8.423
ln country prod hist disco 26,961 5.276 1.986 0 8.649
ForeignNOCshare 26,961 0.0396 0.154 0 1
HomeNOCshare 26,961 0.277 0.407 0 1
ln GDP pc disco 23,359 13.85 1.876 6.804 16.84
ln OilPrice disco 26,961 2.898 1.219 0.761 4.654
polity2 disco 23,312 0.726 0.358 0 1
NatYear 18,146 1,970 19.28 1,926 2,013
OpNatYear 16,548 1,973 19.54 1,938 2,013
A key explanatory variable in my event study empirical estimations is a coun-
try’s choice of nationalizing the sector. For this I rely on the National Oil
Companies (NOC) Dataset by Mahdavi (2020), which covers nationalization
events across 175 sovereign countries over the 1905-2015 period. The key vari-
able of interest from this dataset (Nat) is a dummy which denotes the setting up
of an upstream nationalized oil company with over 50 percent state ownership.
9 I also add a variable (OpNat) from same dataset which denotes when NOC
has reached de facto upstream production capacity. This means that is has the
ability to physically operate and produce from petroleum fields, rather than just
being a participant in projects operated by other companies. As discussed in
Mahdavi (2014) these major nationalization events often happen in waves and
triggered by a sentiment of resource nationalism.
About 2/3 of the assets within the dataset are located in countries where there
was an oil sector nationalization event at some point. Of the 26,961 assets,
18,146 are in a country where the nationalization happened between 1926 to
2013, and 16,548 in a country where the NOC took on an operational role
9Includes partially privatized NOCs (e.g.Petrobras) but does not include NOCs only in-
volved in the downstream sector, e.g. refining NOCs.
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between 1938-2013.
Finally, I analyze a variable which captures the share of state participation
through a national oil company (NOC) in each asset. One variable (Home-
NOCshare) codes for the share of domestic NOCs and one variable (Foreign-
NOCshare) for the sum of stakes of foreign NOCs in each licence (data from
UCube). I measure this variable at the end of nearest 5 year period after dis-
covery. 10
A few countries have no domestic NOCs (e.g. Australia, US) and some have fully
state run sectors (e.g. Iran and Saudi Arabia) but most countries have mixed
regimes, where partnerships between domestic NOCs and other companies are
the norm. The role of NOCs vary within these partnerships, they may act as the
operator or not, they often participate to monitor the project, collect additional
revenues or to obtain know-how from the operator Heller and Mihalyi (2019).
Figure 4 groups the (HomeNOCshare) variable into four categories and depicts
project timelines accordingly. Having larger state ownership is correlated with
slower project timelines although the association is weak (correlation is 0.13
across two variables).
I have explicitly decided not to include any data on extractions costs in the
analysis, despite it being likely an important factor driving extraction decisions
and project timelines. The reason for that is twofold. First, there is no public
data on asset level costs, only expert estimates of costs, which may reflect various
biases. For example, experts may assume that projects that are quick to move
ahead are likely cheaper or have various beliefs about companies, especially
NOCs, who decide to disclose less financial data. Secondly, the cost estimates
will conflate cost drivers that are geological, therefore immutable (e.g. water
depth) with those that reflect country factors subject to change (e.g. country
risk or qualified staff). Separating out variables into geological, time varying
global variables and other country variables can thus better identify the impact
of institutions and policy change.
10This is a result of a data download limitation from the UCube database. For each asset
the data codes the latest owners by default. To bulk retrieve historical ownership I had to
narrow the years to take snapshots from. Ownership changes are rare events, hence this
simplification is unlikely to alter results substantially.
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1- No NOC share 2- Minority share 3- Majority share 4- NOC only
Note: The age of assets yet to start producing are counted until 2020.
Domestic NOC share in an asset (1): HomeNOCshare= 0%, (2) 0% < HomeNOCshare <50% 
(3): 50% <= HomeNOCshare <100%, (4)  HomeNOCshare= 100%
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5 Empirical strategy and analysis
I carry out econometric analyses regarding the factors that affect the speed and
likelihood of a petroleum asset being developed. I use two estimation techniques:
survival analysis and discrete-time event-history analysis (or event study) ap-
proach.
5.1 Survival analysis
Survival analysis is an empirical method used most frequently in epidemiology.
It allows to define a failure event, which in the case of epidemiology is often a
patient’s death, but in this instance it is when the oil asset starts production
(which one may consider labeling a success rather than a failure). The survival
function provides an estimate on the likelihood of an oil field remaining untapped
over the years after discovery. The approach extends on Khan et al. (2016) who
analyzes similar issue in the mining sector.
Survivor function plots using Kaplan–Meier estimator
I employ the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator (Kaplan and Meier, 1958)
of the survivor function, which provides a simple way to evaluate the fraction of
observations, which have remained undeveloped after a number of years. A value
of close to 1 means that an average asset of certain age is almost certainly not
producing, while close to zero means almost certainly producing. The Kaplan-
Meier estimator allows to split the sample into groups and to control for certain
characteristics.
Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier estimate on the likelihood of an asset not moving to
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Figure 6: Timeline from discovery to startup for assets in countries with low vs
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offshore giant gas field discovered in 90s
I present the K-M estimates for the three different periods in Figure 5. First the
full period from discovery to the start of production, then followed by discovery
until approval and third is the approval to start up phase. The steepest - so
quickest and most likely among them - is going from approval to startup stage.
By way of example, I also show the K-M estimates for my main period of analy-
sis, from discovery to start of production comparing assets located in countries
with weak versus strong institutional scores in Figure 6. On the one hand
one may speculate that weaker institutional settings have less ability to exe-
cute complex petroleum projects. Conversely, it is possible that autocracies are
better able to fast track important infrastructure projects by discarding local
resistance to it.
The first plot shows that assets found in countries with lower polity scores at
time of discovery (below -5 on -10 to 10 range) are significantly slower to develop
than those with high scores (above 5 on -10 to 10 range). I also present re-
sults which controls for certain geological characteristics taking the same values
to more closely capture the differences associated with country characteristics
rather than geology. As shown in the second plot of Figure 6, there is a large
difference in timeline across institutional scores when comparing only offshore
giant oil fields discovered in the 90s. While the odds of such an oil asset re-
maining underground within 20 year window is 31 percent when located in a
country with high institutional score, there is a 45 percent chance when located
in a country with low score. That gap increases even further when comparing
fields that are mostly gas rather than oil. The odds of offshore giant gas fields
remaining undeveloped within 20 years is 55 percent when located in countries
with low institutional score at time of discovery or roughly double the odds (27
percent) of those of an asset with similar characteristics but located in one with
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strong institutional score, see plot 3 of Figure 6. The more marked difference
for gas timelines may be attributable to the fact that gas finds requires com-
plex auxiliary infrastructure (either to liquefy for transportation or converting
it to electricity or heating), hence may be more dependent on additional coun-
try factors. Altogether, the above evidence finds that countries with weaker
institutions are slower to execute petroleum projects.
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Survival model- regressions
In order to evaluate the significance of individual variables on project timelines,
there are a number of specifications to consider. The dependent variable can be
three different periods (the full period from discovery to startup, from discovery
to approval and from approval to startup), there are a range of explanatory
variables to consider. Additionally within survival analysis set-up, there are
multiple models: a semi-parametric model, the Cox regression or a parametric
model, such as the Gompertz, Weibull, exponential, etc. I present results from
the cox model, additional model results from multiple parametric models are
shown in appendix.
Key results from analysis
I present results from a Cox regression of the following form.
hi(t) = h0i(t)exp(β1X1 + ...+ βkXk), (1)
where hi(t) is the hazard rate for asset i over time (t) following its discovery,
in other words the rate at which the asset reaches production and X1 - Xk are
series of explanatory variables.
Results are shown in Table 4 for the effects on the full project timeline from
discovery to project start. Column (1) shows time varying and country level
characteristics, while the preferred specification, Table 4 column (4), uses both
country and year fixed effects instead. Time varying control variables (GDP,
polity, oil price, production history) are measured at the year of discovery for
each asset. The year fixed effects capture the discovery year for each asset. I also
show results when including either only year (column 2) or only country (column
3) fixed effects to better understand the drivers of any difference between the
other two specifications.
In table 5 I break down to effects across time periods, separating effects on
discovery to approval stage and on approval to startup periods. For both I
show the results from pooled regression with longer list of controls and the
preferred specification with both country and year fixed effects but shorter list
of controls.
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The results shown highlight the importance of various asset level geological
characteristics. Field size matter, where larger fields are quicker to get approved
but slower to get from approval to startup (overall sign positive but not all
significant). Assets at deeper water depth and which contain more gas (rather
than oil) are slower to complete. Shale gas is much quicker to get from approval
to start, but slower reaching approval (overall signs are mixed). These results
are broadly intuitive and aligned with reporting on the topic in industry press.
The time variant variables have mixed significance. The oil price is not signif-
icant (which may be because asset development decisions are based on future
oil price expectations and not the ones at discovery). Discoveries found in
earlier years were quicker to get approval than newer ones, but are slower to
be executed. This latter result would be consistent with increasing petroleum
abundance and more scrutiny in deciding which field to develop, but also tech-
nological improvement ensuring that fields selected are then developed more
quickly.
Country level variables show that richer countries and those with stronger in-
stitutions at the time of discovery are quicker to develop their assets. This is in
line with intuition that such countries are better able to attract investment and
deliver on complex projects. Worth noting that the effect of the polity variable
disappears in the project execution phase. Countries with more experience in
developing petroleum assets in the past are quicker to develop subsequent finds.
But results lose much of their statistical significance once including country
fixed effects, suggesting that any new learning over time within country is slow.
(Similar patterns of variables losing their significance can be observed when in-
cluding a country’s GDP and polity score together with country fixed effects,
results not shown).
The domestic NOC’s participation share in assets shows mixed results. Larger
domestic NOC share is associated with slower project timelines in the specifi-
cations without country and year fixed effect. Results are very similar when
adding only time fixed effects, therefore this association is not driven by time
periods where both NOCs are more dominant and projects are slower. More in-
terestingly, the domestic NOC variable switches signs after adding country fixed
effects, therefore showing quicker timelines on assets with higher state share
within the same country. One interpretation is that heavy state-ownership in a
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country may be correlated with various factors which slow down projects. On
the other hand, within that country, it is the projects where the NOC plays a
larger role which are more likely to go ahead.
The participation share of foreign NOCs in assets is associated with slower
project timelines across all specifications. While the list of NOCs with foreign
activities is a subset of those operating at home, it suggests that NOCs have an
inherent disadvantage in developing assets globally, which they more than make
up for when developing domestic assets.
Table 4: Results from Cox regressions on discovery to startup time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Disc-Start Disc - Start Disc - Start Disc - Start
ln Field Size 1.007 0.986*** 1.061*** 1.059***
(0.00457) (0.00394) (0.00455) (0.00459)
ln WaterDepth 0.899*** 0.932*** 0.873*** 0.872***
(0.00357) (0.00338) (0.00398) (0.00400)
Gas Share 0.940*** 1.047** 0.838*** 0.840***
(0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0168) (0.0169)
Shale dummy 1.061* 1.290*** 0.776*** 0.744***
(0.0336) (0.0408) (0.0254) (0.0262)






ln GDP pc disco 1.077***
(0.00832)
ln country prod hist disco 1.188*** 1.210*** 1.077*** 1.036*
(0.00929) (0.00596) (0.00805) (0.0192)
HomeNOCshare 0.893*** 0.862*** 1.062** 1.073***
(0.0216) (0.0169) (0.0285) (0.0290)
ForeignNOCshare 0.847*** 0.842*** 0.826*** 0.818***
(0.0454) (0.0408) (0.0451) (0.0448)
Observations 22,558 26,959 26,959 26,959
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES
The table shows the impact of various variables on the hazard ratio
of an asset discovered getting from discovery to start of production.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Results from Cox regressions on partial project timelines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Disc-Appr Disc-Appr Appr-Start Appr-Start
ln Field Size 1.010** 1.057*** 0.972*** 0.990**
(0.00456) (0.00456) (0.00455) (0.00449)
ln WaterDepth 0.910*** 0.887*** 0.953*** 0.924***
(0.00355) (0.00398) (0.00403) (0.00476)
Gas Share 0.961** 0.864*** 0.897*** 0.870***
(0.0191) (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0182)
Shale dummy 0.923** 0.642*** 1.883*** 1.765***
(0.0292) (0.0225) (0.0630) (0.0665)




polity2 disco 1.213*** 0.958
(0.0340) (0.0273)
ln GDP pc disco 1.072*** 1.042***
(0.00817) (0.00833)
ln country prod hist disco 1.191*** 1.022 1.026*** 1.034*
(0.00919) (0.0188) (0.00818) (0.0189)
HomeNOCshare 0.898*** 1.063** 0.960* 1.086***
(0.0214) (0.0283) (0.0227) (0.0304)
ForeignNOCshare 0.854*** 0.842*** 0.853*** 0.813***
(0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0466) (0.0459)
Observations 22,558 26,959 17,343 20,751
Country FE NO YES NO YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES
The table shows the impact of various variables on the hazard ratio of an asset
getting to approval stage or from approval to startup.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Model selection and limitations
I also ran a number of different forms of parametric models, alongside the Cox
model on the timeline from discovery to startup. Results are presented in Table
A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix. Results are very similar to those of the Cox model
presented above across the various specifications after taking to account that
specification in Table A.1 are results in terms of proportional hazard (meaning
a value above 1 is a quicker timeline), while models in Table A.2 are accelerated
failure time models (where a value below 1 is a quicker timeline).
In order for the results from the semi-parametric cox model to hold, they need
to satisfy the so-called proportional-hazards assumption. That means that each
covariate has a multiplicative effect in the hazards function that is constant over
time. This assumption does not hold for the time varying controls.(Results not
shown in this draft).
The various parametric functions I present in the appendix are more flexible
in this regard, they do not require such assumption to hold. Without clear
guidance from theory on the appropriate function form, one may want to select
among parametric functions based on the best fit. This can be done using the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). As reported in the last row of Table A.1
and A.2 in the Appendix, the AIC test suggests that the best fitting model is
the one relying on a logn distribution (Table A.2 - column 2 and column 4 which
have the lowest AIC number).
Discussion
The survival analysis has shown that various geological, country-related and
time-related factors are associated with significant differences in production
timeline. Assets located in countries with higher institutional scores and higher
GDP at time of discovery are quicker to be developed. I obtain quantitatively
similar results using a number of specification of survival models.
A key insight from the analysis is that while larger domestic NOC shares are
correlated with slower project timelines, within a country, it is the assets with
larger NOC shares that are quicker to get developed. This suggests that coun-
tries with higher degree of state of ownership also exhibit additional factors
which may slow down project timelines (e.g. lack of human capital, access to
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technology or regulatory barrier), but that state ownership actually helps in
having an asset developed quicker.
One limitation is that the fixed effect model might capture time-invariant omit-
ted variables, such as longstanding ”cultures” of corruption that may both in-
crease odds of nationalization but slow down the time between discovery and
startup. Such hypothesis would suggest that the domestic NOC effects are
actually underestimated.
Another limitation of this methodology is that it only allows to compare assets
using time invariant characteristics within the life of the asset. Research by
Arezki et al. (2019), Cust and Harding (2019) and Brunnschweiler and Poelhekke
(2019) has established that the process of resource discovery is itself dependent
on institutional factors. For example Brunnschweiler and Poelhekke (2019) finds
that switching to foreign asset ownership results in more exploration and more
finds. Therefore the results I present may be biased as certain countries may
find more fields or fields with characteristics for which we do not control which
in turn could affect project timelines as well. I use an event study approach to
mitigate this risk.
5.2 Event study approach
The event study approach allows to estimate changes in likelihood of an asset
reaching production in the time periods surrounding a particular event. In this
case, I present results from analyzing likelihoods of production start in the years
before and after the country nationalizes the sector through setting up a national
oil company with a role in domestic production.
In order to implement that I transform the data into a discrete-time event-
history model setup. In this approach all years when the asset is not producing
are considered a separate observation with an additional observation for the year
the asset starts up production. I create a panel consisting of each asset across
the years observed until startup. A dummy variable codes for whether the asset
started producing in a given year or not yet (Start). Using the startup event as
my dependent variable, I run a linear panel model with a range of explanatory
variables. This approach allows to include time-varying explanatory variables
for every year of the asset’s pre-production life instead of having to pick a single
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year for each asset (e.g. the discovery year, as done in the survival analysis
presented above).
I follow a linear panel event study approach using the regression presented in
Equation 2.
Although the explanatory variable is binary, I use a linear panel model with
many levels of fixed effects (Correia, 2016). 11 I use country-level fixed effects
and year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the country-level.
12
Startc,i,t = β0+β1PostNOCc,t+β2age+β3age
2+β4Zc,i,t+αc+ δt+ ǫc,i,t (2)
where Starti,c,t represents a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if asset i in coun-
try c starts production in year t. The main variable of interest is PostNOCt,c,
taking a value of 1 if the country c has established an NOC in any given year
prior to t. I also include an asset age variable age and age squared age2 variable
to capture the fact that the petroleum field has a decreasing likelihood of opening
as years progress. A series of control variables are denoted Z. The list of asset
level controls are the same as in section above: Shale dummy, ln F ield Size,
Gas Share, ln WaterDepth and ln country prod hist). I do not add a control
variable on NOC participation share given the main sock variable of interest is
closely related. I add country and year fixed effects (αc and δt ) to all specifi-
cations, which capture country characteristics (such as resource endowments or
human capital) and time trends (including the changes in oil price and effects
of technological progress).
I use this approach to test for the significance of countries nationalizing the
industry as an explanatory variable. I analyze observations around this event
in a way which includes some assets that spent all the time prior, only post the
event but also some that have spent some years both prior and after the shock.
11This follows (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) who suggest that a linear model is more straight-
forward to analyze than a logistic model especially when dealing with small changes in likeli-
hoods.
12I use robust standard errors clustered at the country-level for experimental design reasons:
the level of treatment (nationalization) is at the country-year level, while observations are at
asset-year level (Abadie et al., 2017). In appendix I show asset level clustering also, where
results are stronger.
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A set of dummy variables capture all possible lags and leads to the event. 13
Key results from analysis
The Table 6 shows the results of the main regression. It measures the impact
of various variables on the likelihood of an oil asset reaching start up stage in
any given year. The age variable and age-squared variable capture the fact
that assets have a decreasing likelihood of opening as years progress albeit at
diminishing rates. (While the likelihood of opening drops sharply in the initial
years it later decelerates.) Additional asset level controls used in earlier regres-
sions are also included and show similar results although not always significant.
Larger fields and shale assets are quicker, deeper fields and those with higher
proportion of gas are slower.
The new insight comes from the inclusion of a dummy variable on whether the
country has nationalized its industry through setting up a national oil company
at any point in time. Four fifth of all observations are located in countries which
eventually set up an NOC. 14 In Table 6 I show that assets are 1.4 percentage
point more likely to open up after a national oil company was set up (Post-Nat)
or after a national oil company with an operational role(Post-OPNat) was set
up.
Having included year fixed effects capture spurious correlations in case years
with more oil sector nationalization events globally coincided with periods when
more project were about to start up. The country fixed effect capture spurious
correlations where geography may be correlated with both nationalized oil sec-
tors and petroleum assets which may be easier to develop. The ln country prod hist
variable captures spurious correlation where country production trends may
drive both increased country-level knowledge on how to develop assets and de-
sire to nationalize the industry. The robust standard errors clustered at the
country level ensure that the results are not overly driven by very few countries
with many assets.
The results presented here indicate that there is an increase in likelihood of
assets turning to production in the years following an NOC being set up. While
the typical asset has 6.4 percent likelihood of starting up in any given year,
13I follow (Clarke and Schythe, 2020) in implementing the event study.
14The US and Australia are the two petroleum producers with no NOCs with the largest
number of assets alongside some other countries with fewer assets.
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the odds increase by about 1.4 percentage point after NOC is set up (Table 6,
column 1). This is equivalent to a 20 percent increase in likelihood of project
start up in any given year. Results are similar when measuring what happens
after an NOC takes on an operational role (Table 6, column 2). 15.
Next, I analyze the effects measured above over time. The Figure 7 depicts how
the chances of an asset starting up changes in the 15 years prior to and up to
30 years after an NOC is being set up.16 The reference year used, where the
coefficient is set to zero, is the year prior to opening up: the results shown for
all other years are in comparison to this one.
While there are no strong trends in the years prior to establishing the NOC,
within 15 year of setting up the NOC there is a positive and significant increase
in asset start up likelihood (bars show 95 percent confidence intervals). These
effects are similar but somewhat less pronounced when looking at national oil
companies taking on an operational role (Figure 7, right panel).
In the appendix, I also show a regression extending Table A.4 with dummies
coding for 5 year time periods prior and after nationalization events similar to
those shown Figure 7. Using the 5 year prior to nationalization as the base
period, it also shows a significant jump in asset startup likelihood in the years
5+ after nationalization events.
15The two variables are not jointly significant when included in same regression. This is
likely a result of strong overlap between two variables, with two events either coinciding or
following each other with small timelag
1640 percent of all observations (including those where no NAT event happened) fall within
this time window. I show a histogram in Appendix Figure ??.
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Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
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Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's operational nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
Number of assets: 26960. Confidence intervals: 95 %
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age sq 5.76e-05*** 5.75e-05***
(1.08e-05) (1.08e-05)
ln Field Size 0.00562** 0.00560**
(0.00232) (0.00232)
ln WaterDepth -0.00931*** -0.00928***
(0.00109) (0.00110)
Shale dummy 0.0118 0.0120
(0.0249) (0.0248)
Gas Share -0.0124 -0.0125
(0.0116) (0.0116)










Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
The table shows the impact of various variables on an production start dummy
where each observation represents a year of the asset’s life from discovery to production start.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Robustness
I carry out a number of alternative specifications to ensure the robustness of
the key results, with results shown in the Appendix.
First, I replicate the main specification by dropping any countries with over 100
petroleum assets one at a time. I check how the central estimate of the (Post-
Nat) dummy changes in regressions where one country is left out. As shown in
Figure A.3, the results barely change irrespective of which country is dropped.
Second, I remove the restriction on the time window observed prior and after
the setting up of national oil companies and one with operational role Figure
A.4 . Given the sharp drop in observations when measuring larger time lags,
this leads to less robust estimates but the overall pattern is still visible.
Third, I measure the effects of setting up a national oil company on asset ap-
proval rather than on asset startup. As shown in Figure A.5, I find similar
impacts as earlier shown .
Fourth, I calculate results using robust standard errors clustered at the asset-
level. As shown in Figure A.6 results remain unchanged in magnitude and con-
fidence intervals become smaller. (This suggests that the variance is correlated
at the country-level and not at the asset-level).
Fifth, I have repeated the analysis on three samples that differ somewhat to the
original one, as shown in Figure A.7. This includes dropping all shale assets,
which tend to have longer approval timelines but quicker execution timelines
(left plot). Alternatively, I add assets which represent subsequent phases of
existing fields back to the sample (center plot), which had been dropped as
considered less pertinent for this analysis. Finally I exclude all assets that have
spent at least 40 years without production (right plot). These may be considered
as outliers in terms of the slowness of their development. The results remain
largely unaffected by either of these sample changes.
One important caveat to the main results is that the coefficients on project start
prior to nationalization are not all null. They are often negative across specifi-
cations, especially when looking back multiple decades prior to nationalization.
This would suggest that there may be an increased likelihood of nationalization
after longer periods of under-performance in asset start-up. This pattern would
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broadly fit the observation by Mahdavi (2014) that nationalization events are
aimed at maximizing sector revenues. Discussion
I have shown that setting up a national oil company within a country is fol-
lowed by a 1.4 percentage point (or about 20 percent) increase in likelihood of
assets turning to production in any given year. The geological variables, the
country, year fixed effects and production history variable control for the effects
of potential confounders such as trends in oil price, technology, differences in
endowments and country experience. The results are robust to alternative spec-
ifications and to dropping groups of observations. This approach still has some
limitations, as it can’t discern any hidden third factor that both contributes
to countries setting up national oil companies and quicker project timelines.
Further investigation will be required to firmly prove causality.
There are a number of potential hypothetical channels which may explain the
observed association. For example, the NOC’s involvement in an asset may be
help overcoming bureaucratic setbacks, more able to garner support for devel-
oping the project or they may be more willing to take larger financial risks (as
suggested by Marcel (2019)).
Another hypothesis consistent with the results is that a government which wants
a priori to increase depletion rates can only effectively do so with NOC control.
The government cannot reasonably force foreign companies to produce quicker
or startup assets faster if the companies do not believe it wise to do so. Gov-
ernments with NOCs may deliberately want to speed up the extraction process
even if it comes at a future cost – e.g., rapid depressurization of wells. This
is consistent with results by Mahdavi (2020) who suggests leaders who have
constrained time horizons are more likely to opt for operational control in the
hands of NOCs.
Part of the association may be indirect, driven by a third factor, such as a
greater desire by the government to achieve energy independence. This could
drive both larger likelihood of nationalization and also accelerated production.
Nevertheless, the observed association between higher state control and quicker
project timeline is telling irrespective of whether it is caused by the national oil
company directly or an underlying third factor, such as resource nationalism.




I presented a detailed analysis on the factors that influence the speed at which
petroleum assets are being developed globally. I have shown that on top of
geological factors, which are beyond the country’s own control, a country’s in-
stitutional and developmental characteristics also matter matter for the speed
at which petroleum assets are being developed. My findings imply that ear-
lier research relying on lagged impacts of giant petroleum discoveries produced
biased estimates of subsequent oil production. They underestimated the post-
production impacts from countries that are slower to extract their resources.
Alternatively, some of the impacts (e.g. increase in conflict or borrowing) these
articles had captured may in fact have happened prior to the start of production.
While state ownership of resource sector is associated with slower project time-
lines overall, this correlation is misleading. Countries with high degree of state
of ownership are likelier to also exhibit other factors (geological or institutional)
which may slow down project timelines. Within a country, it is the assets with
larger state share that are the quicker to be developed. In an event study I have
also shown that the likelihood of assets getting developed increases after setting
up a national oil company. These results suggest state ownership may in fact
help rather than hinder asset development timelines. Further research is need
to firmly establish causality.
In order to mitigate climate change, a large share of already discovered petroleum
resources need to remain underground. But economists have also warned of the
risk of a green paradox, where oil companies decide to accelerate fuel extraction
in anticipation of a shift to renewable energy. Further work building on my
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Results from proportional hazard parametric regressions w AIC test
results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES exp gom wei exp gom wei
ln Field Size 1.020*** 1.010** 1.018*** 1.076*** 1.063*** 1.077***
(0.00454) (0.00456) (0.00455) (0.00459) (0.00459) (0.00460)
ln WaterDepth 0.886*** 0.896*** 0.889*** 0.865*** 0.872*** 0.864***
(0.00347) (0.00355) (0.00350) (0.00387) (0.00396) (0.00387)
Gas Share 0.967* 0.948*** 0.963* 0.843*** 0.846*** 0.843***
(0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169)
Shale dummy 1.023 1.067** 1.018 0.676*** 0.724*** 0.675***
(0.0320) (0.0337) (0.0319) (0.0235) (0.0253) (0.0235)
ln OilPrice disco 0.969** 0.974* 0.969**
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0140)
DiscoveryYear 0.997** 0.991*** 0.996***
(0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105)
ln country prod hist disco 1.233*** 1.201*** 1.224*** 1.045** 1.031* 1.045**
(0.00961) (0.00940) (0.00957) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0193)
HomeNOCshare 0.895*** 0.897*** 0.897*** 1.088*** 1.083*** 1.088***
(0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292)
ForeignNOCshare 0.884** 0.865*** 0.883** 0.819*** 0.826*** 0.819***
(0.0470) (0.0463) (0.0470) (0.0449) (0.0452) (0.0449)
polity2 disco 1.280*** 1.212*** 1.266***
(0.0360) (0.0342) (0.0357)
ln GDP pc disco 1.105*** 1.084*** 1.098***
(0.00859) (0.00841) (0.00853)
Observations 22,558 22,558 22,558 26,959 26,959 26,959
Country FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
AIC 67326 65368 67186 75837 74779 75837
The table shows the impact of various variables on the hazard ratio
of an asset discovered reaching the start of production.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.2: Results from accelerated failure time model parametric regressions
(estimates are reversed with values above 1 being slower) and AIC test results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES logl logn logl logn
ln Field Size 0.998 0.998 0.937*** 0.937***
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00425) (0.00417)
ln WaterDepth 1.158*** 1.153*** 1.185*** 1.179***
(0.00495) (0.00483) (0.00556) (0.00547)
Gas Share 1.175*** 1.158*** 1.323*** 1.308***
(0.0258) (0.0248) (0.0267) (0.0260)
Shale dummy 1.217*** 1.176*** 1.808*** 1.689***
(0.0430) (0.0422) (0.0657) (0.0609)




ln country prod hist disco 0.783*** 0.795*** 0.937*** 0.938***
(0.00659) (0.00637) (0.0173) (0.0168)
HomeNOCshare 1.170*** 1.186*** 0.859*** 0.877***
(0.0293) (0.0286) (0.0229) (0.0227)
ForeignNOCshare 1.339*** 1.296*** 1.298*** 1.258***
(0.0768) (0.0716) (0.0682) (0.0641)
polity2 disco 0.790*** 0.786***
(0.0243) (0.0231)
ln GDP pc disco 0.946*** 0.947***
(0.00775) (0.00742)
Observations 22,558 22,558 26,959 26,959
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO NO YES YES
AIC 63521 63057 71483 71118
The table shows the impact of various variables on the accelerated failure time
of an asset discovered reaching the start of production.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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age sq 5.65e-05*** 0.000106***
(1.05e-05) (2.21e-05)
ln Field Size 0.00562** 0.00599**
(0.00232) (0.00272)
ln WaterDepth -0.00924*** -0.00935***
(0.00106) (0.00135)
Shale dummy 0.0156 -0.00825
(0.0221) (0.0292)
Gas Share -0.0127 -0.0113
(0.0112) (0.0137)
ln country appr hist 0.0233***
(0.00404)
ln country prod hist 0.0381***
(0.00508)
pre nat 15 -0.0207*** -0.0279***
(0.00618) (0.00999)
pre nat 10 15 0.00281 -0.0179**
(0.0110) (0.00804)
pre nat 5 10 -0.00701 -0.00464
(0.00451) (0.00582)
post nat 0 5 0.00547 0.00814*
(0.00387) (0.00463)
post nat 5 10 0.0116** 0.0139**
(0.00493) (0.00540)
post nat 10 15 0.0124** 0.0186**
(0.00535) (0.00740)
post nat 15 20 0.0215*** 0.0301***
(0.00764) (0.0103)
post nat 20 25 0.0258*** 0.0400***
(0.00754) (0.0110)
post nat 25 30 0.0317*** 0.0462***
(0.00966) (0.0143)






Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
The table shows the impact of various variables on an production start dummy and approval dummy
where each observation represents a year of the asset’s life from discovery to production start.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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age sq 5.66e-05*** 0.000107***
(1.04e-05) (2.19e-05)
ln Field Size 0.00559** 0.00592**
(0.00232) (0.00272)
ln WaterDepth -0.00916*** -0.00921***
(0.00110) (0.00141)
Shale dummy 0.0144 -0.0104
(0.0231) (0.0314)
Gas Share -0.0127 -0.0113
(0.0113) (0.0139)
ln country prod hist 0.0385***
(0.00545)
ln country appr hist 0.0235***
(0.00413)
pre opnat 15 -0.0141*** -0.0202**
(0.00529) (0.00985)
pre opnat 10 15 0.00323 -0.00693
(0.00693) (0.00710)
pre opnat 5 10 -0.00112 0.00193
(0.00424) (0.00559)
post opnat 0 5 0.00389 0.00861
(0.00427) (0.00530)
post opnat 5 10 0.0120*** 0.0162***
(0.00442) (0.00562)
post opnat 10 15 0.0145** 0.0203**
(0.00563) (0.00826)
post opnat 15 20 0.0212*** 0.0263**
(0.00810) (0.0114)
post opnat 20 25 0.0230*** 0.0339***
(0.00842) (0.0123)
post opnat 25 30 0.0248** 0.0392**
(0.0115) (0.0156)






Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
The table shows the impact of various variables on an production start dummy and approval dummy
where each observation represents a year of the asset’s life from discovery to production start.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Figure A.1: Histogram of nationalization / operational nationalization events
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94,152 out of 223,044 observations missing
due to no OP NOCs established in the country
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Figure A.3: Leave one country out regression results. The coefficient of the
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Coefficient of the post-nat variable in main regression, when leaving selected country out.
Only showing results for countries represented in the dataset with at least 100 assets.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country. 
95% confidence intervals.
Figure A.4: Asset starting up around nationalization / operational nationaliza-
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Years from nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country. 
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Years from operational nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's operational nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country. 
Number of assets: 26960. Confidence intervals: 95 %
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Years from nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country appr hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.





















-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Years from operational nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's operational nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country appr hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
Number of assets: 26960. Confidence intervals: 95 %
Figure A.6: Asset starting up around nationalization / operational nationaliza-























-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Years from nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is lead 1, the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
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Years from operational nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's operational nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country. 
Number of assets: 26960. Confidence intervals: 95 %
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Years from  nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
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Years from  nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
Assets: 27689. Includes asset extensions and follow-up phases. 
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Years from  nationalization event
Point Estimate 95% CI
Note: Base category is the year prior to country's nationalization event.
Controls: age, age sq, field size, water depth, shale, gas share, country prod hist.
Country and year fixed effects. Robust s.e. clustered by country.
Assets: 25626. Excludes assets that have spent over 40 years before production start.
Confidence intervals: 95 %
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